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HOw etHICs COMMIttees
MAY GO wrONG
There are many ways in which eth-ics committees (ECs) may func-tion sub-optimally or in a way that 
does harm. A number of these actions 
on the part of ECs have been noted in 
the literature. Recently, for example, Fox, 
Myers, and Pearlman (2007) surveyed 
several ECs and reported two remark-
able findings. First, many committees 
take votes. Second, many make single 
recommendations. Both practices are 
ethically problematic when competing 
values are at stake because they may 
result in the moral biases of a majority 
of EC members overriding the values of 
patients or their loved ones. As Fiester 
has stated, such an EC’s recommendation 
is, at best, “its best guess,” and this is not 
a good enough rationale to dictate the 
course for a patient (Feister, 2007, p. 32). 
The practice of making a single rec-
ommendation may reflect a failure to 
understand the most basic limitations of 
ethics. That is, ethical analysis often can-
not determine which of competing clini-
cal choices is more “right” than another. 
For example, it cannot determine when, 
if ever, it is right to have an abortion. 
The reason for this is that the two values 
most at stake are mutually exclusive, and 
ethical analysis simply cannot determine 
which value, preserving potential hu-
man life or protecting a woman’s bodily 
privacy, should prevail.
The implication of this limitation for 
ECs is far reaching. In the vast majority 
of ethical dilemmas in which competing, 
mutually exclusive value conflicts are at 
stake, ethical analysis cannot say which 
single course of action should prevail. 
What it can say is what kinds of argu-
ments most warrant moral weight, and 
whether all the arguments that should be 
“on the table” have been identified.
In most cases, what ECs should offer 
is acceptable ethical options. What they 
should not do is offer single recommen-
dations, particularly when these have 
been decided by a vote. The moral flaw 
in an EC voting is hopefully self-evident: 
how this vote turns out may depend on 
any number of factors, many of which 
are highly arbitrary. These arbitrary 
factors may include who happens to be 
present at a given meeting and what these 
persons’ views on the issues before them 
happens to be.
Patients, their loved ones, and others 
personally involved in a case may justifi-
ably experience rage when an EC votes 
and then tells the patient, family mem-
bers, or clinicians what they should do. 
This rage was experienced and expressed 
by many in a recent case I learned of in-
volving a hospital EC that was faced with 
the question of what to do in regard to a 
severely impaired newborn. The com-
mittee voted and then indicated that in 
its “view” the infant’s doctors should do 
all they could to maintain the child’s life. 
Many of the pediatricians at the hospital 
strongly disagreed. 
The source of the rage was that the EC 
had gone beyond what ethical analysis 
could determine. Further, since the EC 
had “declared” this, it was much more 
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difficult for the parents and staff to go 
any other way!
ECs may miss seeing this poten-
tial flaw in their ethical reasoning, as 
well as the negative consequences of 
their using this reasoning to declare 
what should be done. This oversight 
may stem from the false conclusion 
that if a single EC recommendation 
is appropriate in one case, it is ap-
propriate for all cases. Providing a 
single recommendation in some cases 
is wholly reasonable. For example, in 
another case in which I was involved, 
a doctor would not write a Do-Not-
Resuscitate (DNR) order requested by 
his patient. The patient had cancer and 
chemotherapy had not been successful. 
His physician believed that the patient 
still had some chance to be cured by a 
chemotherapy trial. The physician also 
believed that when the patient entered 
the hospital and accepted his care, the 
patient implicitly was agreeing to the 
doctor making this decision on his 
behalf. The EC felt, in this case, that it 
had to intervene. 
The actual outcome illustrates an op-
tion ECs should keep in mind. An EC 
member resolved this impasse wholly 
by meeting with this doctor informally 
over coffee. In this example, it seemed 
apparent to all on this EC that the phy-
sician had no morally justifiable reason 
to refuse to write the DNR order for 
this patient.  In this case, it may be that 
since the physician’s action was unjus-
tifiable, the EC had a moral obligation 
to act on the basis of its moral judg-
ment, and to intervene. In other cases, 
the EC's moral obligation may be just 
the opposite; namely, to not make a 
single recommendation when there is 
more than one reasonable option.
But what should an EC do when 
reasonable persons identify more than 
one ethically appropriate response to a 
values conflict, whether or not all the 
committee members around the table 
happen to share the same view? They 
may best serve the relevant stakehold-
ers by shifting the question from what 
west VIrGINIA 
NetwOrk Of 
etHICs COMMIttees 
(wVNeC)
The West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees (WVNEC) 
is collaborating with MHECN on a 
conference on May 14, 2008, entitled, 
“More is Not Always Better: Seeking 
Value in End-of-Life Care.” MHECN 
members will receive a 20% discount on 
registration fees for this conference, which 
will take place in Morgantown, VA. Visit 
www.hsc.wvu.edu/chel/wvnec/ for more 
information, or contact Cindy Jamison at: 
(877) 209-8086, e-mail cjamison@hsc.
wvu.edu. 
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the right answer is to who should de-
cide. Most often, this decision should 
be left to those most closely involved. 
Parents should generally make deci-
sions when the patient is their own 
child. The moral wrong to be avoided 
here is for ECs to make these deci-
sions themselves, when those who 
should make these decisions are others 
more closely involved with the patient 
and his or her care.
This ethically unwarranted usurp-
ing of patients and loved ones’ right-
ful roles also occurs among ethics 
consultants, sometimes outside their 
conscious awareness. Watkins and 
colleagues (2007) describe a case 
involving a physician who requested 
an ethics consult for a patient who 
was gravely ill. The physician favored 
withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ment (LST) for this patient, while the 
family favored continuing LST. The 
consultant repeatedly offered the fam-
ily reassurance. However, when the 
family requested continuing LST for 
the patient, the consultant responded 
by asking the physician to review 
the patient's grim prognosis (what 
Watkins and colleagues call the “dire 
scenario”).
In this situation, the ethics consul-
tant tried to persuade the family to 
make a particular choice, not because 
it was the only ethically justifiable 
choice, but because the ethics consul-
tant believed it was the right choice. 
When ethical analysis cannot deter-
mine which of reasonable, competing, 
mutually exclusive values should pre-
vail, it is arbitrary to identify only one 
choice as being right. So, what does 
the EC offer in such cases? It should 
offer the widest range of sound differ-
ent views and an extensive process of 
debate and deliberation—much like a 
jury, although without a single verdict.
On a related topic, ECs go wrong 
when their members knowingly or 
unknowingly take on a role as “enforc-
ers” of their hospital’s institutional 
needs or “hidden agendas.” In those 
cases, ECs’ agendas shift from provid-
ing a broader and richer analysis of the 
relevant ethical issues, to influencing 
patients or their loved ones to comply. 
In general, ECs should meet patients’ 
and families’ needs over the interests 
of their institution. 
An example of such a hidden agenda 
is a staff member seeking an EC’s help 
in persuading patients or their loved 
ones to stop using up limited re-
sources such as blood, or an ICU bed. 
ECs faced with such hidden agendas 
should, of course, spot them and then 
consider refusing, since this is not their 
appropriate role. If they choose to take 
on these agendas, they should make 
it clear to patients and/or their loved 
ones that this is what they are “up to,” 
and what the hospital staff is asking 
them to do. This transparent approach 
respects the patient’s and family’s 
dignity by ECs not engaging in deceit. 
Patients and their loved ones, once 
accurately informed in these instances, 
may understandably refuse to be in-
volved in further such discussions. 
The value of the EC lies in its ability 
to provide the most relevant facts and 
the best moral reasoning that can be 
“on the table.” This greatest potential 
of EC’s suggests two practical goals 
that all ECs should pursue.  First, they 
should strive to be sure that all mem-
bers present are heard. Second, they 
should strive to provide time—or some 
other means—of being able to insure 
that this occurs.
Commonly, members “higher” 
on the “medical hierarchy,” such as 
attending physicians and commit-
tee chairs, tend to speak most during 
committee discussions, and others say 
less, in part, because they may feel 
intimidated.  I can recall, for example, 
numerous times during which I have 
remained silent through most of a 
discussion, only to finally speak. Once 
I spoke, others who had been silent 
until that time echoed my comments, 
perhaps feeling safer to say what they 
felt.
All EC members and chairs should 
take personal responsibility to insure 
that those with “less power” can 
speak. If all members do this, unprec-
edented group upheaval may initially 
result. However, this upheaval may be 
unavoidable for the EC to be able to 
achieve the most desirable end result.
In sum, ECs have the capacity 
both to help and to harm patients. 
Their capacity to harm arises, in part, 
from several pitfalls discussed here. 
These include making single rec-
ommendations when there is more 
than one ethically reasonable option, 
voting, adopting a hidden agenda, 
and responding in ways that overly 
influence or even determine patient 
outcomes, when other options may 
be ethically reasonable. Hopefully, if 
members are aware of such pitfalls, 
they can better avoid them. 
Edmund G. Howe, MD, JD
Professor, Department of Psychiatry
Director, Program in Medical Ethics
Senior Scientist, Center for the Study 
of Traumatic Stress, USUHS
Bethesda, MD
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EDITORIAL: DISABILITY RIGHTS AND MEDICAL ETHICS
In 2007 hundreds of articles were written about the Ashley Treatment—the subject of Anita 
J. Tarzian’s article “Disability and 
Slippery Slopes” (Mid-Atlantic Ethics 
Committee Newsletter, Spring 2007). 
Over the course of the year thousands 
of people turned to the internet for 
more information about Ashley X. 
Despite the tremendous interest in what 
was done to Ashley X, no mainstream 
press outlets have presented or delved 
into what disability rights activists have 
to say about the case. Medical ethics 
committees and medical commentators 
have been virtually silent as well. I find 
this alarming, in part because disability 
rights activists, disability studies 
scholars, and disability related blogs 
have been abuzz with activity and are, 
literally, one click away on the internet 
(for example, see disstud.blogspot.com/ 
and http://notdeadyetnewscommentary.
blogspot.com/).  There are, of course, 
a few exceptions, but to the best of 
my knowledge, Tarzian is alone in 
her effort as a medical ethicist to 
understand the Ashley Case from a 
disability rights perspective. Tarzian 
is to be commended for connecting 
the ethical dimensions of the Ashley 
Treatment and the civil rights of 
disabled people in this country and 
beyond.  However, there are elements 
of her discussion that I strongly 
disagree with—specifically her 
position that the rights of those with 
cognitive and physical disabilities are 
fundamentally different.
Before I outline my reasons for 
why I, a disability rights activist and 
scholar, strenuously object to Tarzian’s 
attempt to separate the rights of those 
with cognitive and physical disabilities, 
let me start by stating that we do share 
some common ground.  American so-
ciety is inherently biased against those 
with disabilities—both cognitive and 
physical. This inherent bias has a direct 
impact on medical decision-making 
strategies. The Ashley Treatment is an 
extreme example of this. I agree with 
Tarzian that marginalized people or 
those who have been ignored should 
not only be included but also play an 
active role on medical ethics boards. 
For example, disabled, transgendered, 
and conjoined populations to name 
just three should be given a voice, as 
they have been and remain well outside 
contemporary power structures. 
Tarzian and I also agree that every 
effort should be made to maximize the 
autonomy and opportunities for those 
with any given disability. Here is where 
our views begin to diverge in tone and 
scope. Equality is the starting point for 
any discussion of disability rights—it 
is not a choice nor is it something that 
society should “strive for” as Tarzian 
puts it.  The fact is, it is the law and has 
been since the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) was passed seventeen 
years ago.  Yet, blatant discrimination 
and outright bigotry remain common 
place for people with disabilities. It is 
something I face every time I leave my 
home for work or go to school to pick 
up my son. It impacts every facet of my 
life. In my experience, the civil rights 
of disabled people are perceived as 
somehow different in the United States. 
When this is combined with repressive 
Supreme Court decisions, particularly 
the Sutton Trilogy [Albertson’s Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg (1999) 527 US 555, 199 
S Ct 2162; Murphy v. UPS (1999) 527 
US 516, 119 S Ct 2133; Sutton v. Unit-
ed Airlines (2002) 527 US 471, 199 
S Ct 2139], our country’s record in sup-
port of the rights of disabled people is 
abysmal.  This is, in part, why Tarzian’s 
effort to establish a distinction between 
the rights of people with a physical and 
cognitive disability, though well inten-
tioned, has ominous implications in the 
aftermath of the Ashley X case. It is 
also reflective of a Supreme Court that 
can and does deem people either “too 
disabled” or not “disabled enough” 
to be eligible for protection under the 
ADA. 
Tarzian acknowledges disabled 
people have every right to “feel threat-
ened and frustrated by others false as-
sumptions about their rights, worth and 
abilities.” She also acknowledges and 
condemns past abuses, most notably 
the Eugenics movement that resulted 
in the death and forced sterilizations 
of thousands of people in this country.  
This condemnation is nice but does not 
help Ashley X or me when I interact 
with others, many of whom pity my 
existence or assume I am physically 
and cognitively disabled. There is no 
“fuzzy logic” here—discrimination 
hurts Ashley X just as much as it hurts 
me.  At issue are the civil rights of 
those least able to protect themselves, 
and in my opinion the most stigma-
tized and devalued members of our 
society. Surely, the medical community 
and American society in general can 
do better. And while I acknowledge 
things have gotten better, I also am 
cognizant that it was just thirty years 
ago that people like Ashley X and all 
those with a cognitive disability would 
have been forced into an institution 
like the notorious Willowbrook.  For 
decades, it was thought that institution-
alization was in the best interests of 
the parents, family, and child. Doctors, 
nurses, and social workers all recom-
mended institutionalization. No parent, 
it was thought, could handle caring for 
a cognitively disabled child—an argu-
ment based on stigma, fear, and public 
sentiment. The institutionalization of 
those with cognitive disabilities was 
the norm. In 1967, at its peak, as many 
as 100,000 children were institutional-
ized in 162 state facilities across the 
country. Conditions at these facilities 
were horrific, and in retrospect, we 
know there was no medical reason for 
institutionalization.
Tarzian acknowledges two models for 
disability exist—medical and social—
but wonders if the term “disabled” used 
to describe Ashley X and others like her 
is a misnomer. For me, this is an indica-
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tion of how distorted the social percep-
tion of disability remains in the medical 
community. Tarzian is not alone and is 
in good company. The Supreme Court is 
equally confused because their deci-
sions have gutted the ADA—literally 
torn out the heart of the legislation’s 
intent. Like it or not, disability is first 
and foremost a social construct. The 
vast majority of disabled people are 
oppressed—66% are unemployed and 
very few have adequate health insur-
ance. Disabled people are keenly aware 
that medical and ethical decisions are 
not made in a vacuum. Stigma still fig-
ures significantly in the social construc-
tion of disability and the treatment of 
disabled people. Even Hollywood has 
gotten into the act with what disability 
rights activists characterize as “dis-
ability snuff films.” Here I refer to films 
like the highly acclaimed Million Dollar 
Baby. This film delivered a clear mes-
sage that tapped into the basest elements 
of humanity in which death was prefer-
able to permanent disability. I recall see-
ing this movie in the theatre and being 
shocked that people cheered when the 
main character was killed. These same 
cheering people seemed embarrassed by 
my presence and refused to look me in 
the eye as they left the theatre.
 The medical, legal and ethical 
systems, past and present, have con-
sistently failed to protect people with 
physical and cognitive disabilities. The 
governmental, medical, and social in-
frastructure needed to protect the rights 
of all disabled people remains woefully 
inadequate. This has led some legisla-
TARZIAN'S RESPONSE TO PEACE'S EDITORIAL
My intent in the article Dr. Peace refers to was not to draw distinctions between 
persons with physical and cognitive dis-
abilities. Rather, I intended to make the 
following two points:  “Disabled” does 
not appear to accurately describe the 
status of individuals who are irrevers-
ibly unconscious (like Terri Schiavo) or 
irreversibly neurologically devastated 
(like Ashley X). Holding these cases up 
as paradigmatic of a “disability rights” 
agenda seems to reinforce the negative 
stereotypes that “able-bodied” (and 
minded) persons project onto persons 
with disabilities (both physical and 
cognitive). 
The “Ashley Treatment” can cer-
tainly be judged unethical based on a 
slippery slope argument (i.e., that while 
it may not have harmed Ashley, its 
acceptance will harm others by facili-
tating misapplication to individuals 
with less profound neurological impair-
ments). But critics tried to denounce 
the "Ashley Treatment" using slippery 
slope arguments disguised as indi-
vidual benefits-burdens analyses. That 
is, rather than argue that the harms to 
Ashley of the hormones and surgery 
she received outweighed the benefits 
to her, opponents argued that harms to-
ward others if the “Ashley Treatment” 
gained acceptance didn’t outweigh 
benefits toward Ashley and her family. 
I accept the slippery slope argument, 
but have not been convinced that indi-
vidual harms to Ashley outweigh ben-
efits to her and her family, particularly 
since the “treatments” (“yuk factor” 
notwithstanding) were implemented 
with the intent to keep Ashley out of 
the institutions Peace refers to. Con-
cerns about surgery risk are no longer 
relevant. Direct harms to her related to 
being de-sexualized (by breast bud and 
uterus removal) and infantilized (by 
height-stunting hormones) are hard to 
substantiate for Ashley, whose cogni-
tive capacity will not develop beyond 
that of a three month old.  
Having clarified these points, I am 
struck by Peace’s call for solidarity to 
protect the civil rights of people who 
face discrimination on the basis of 
a disability. This involves educating 
ourselves about our own blind spots 
and biases. I’m all for that. But I am 
not convinced that Ashley and Terri 
Schiavo are victims of discrimination 
based on a disability. 
One definition of discriminate is 
“to make a distinction in favor of 
or against a person or thing on the 
basis of the group, class, or category 
to which the person or thing be-
longs rather than according to actual 
merit” (www.dictionary.com). Peace 
gives a good example of this in the 
movie Million Dollar Baby, when 
the main character’s wish for death 
over permanent disability is actual-
ized, evoking cheers from the theater 
audience. These moviegoers displayed 
a common disability-based prejudice 
in our individualistic society: the belief 
that anyone would prefer death over 
a life of paralysis and dependence on 
others. If the societal shared belief 
was, instead, that people who become 
paralyzed should focus on what they 
can do and get the help they need to 
tors to initiate the ADA Restoration 
Act—an effort that has gone virtually 
unreported. This is a move in the right 
direction for the civil rights of disabled 
people in this country. It is a progres-
sive move, one that acknowledges past 
abuses and contemporary failures. In 
contrast, I worry about Tarzian and 
other medical ethicists who want to 
separate the civil rights of people with 
cognitive disabilities from those with 
a physical disability. I understand the 
medical needs of those with a cognitive 
disability and physical disability are dif-
ferent, but their civil rights—their status 
as human beings—is identical.
William J. Peace, PhD 
Independent Scholar 
Katonah, N.Y.
http://badcripple.blogspot.com/
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CAse PreseNtAtION
One of the regular features of the Newsletter is the presentation 
of a case considered by an ethics 
committee and an analysis of the 
ethical issues involved.  Readers are 
both encouraged to comment on the 
case or analysis and to submit other 
cases that their ethics committee has 
dealt with.  In all cases, identifying 
information about patients and others 
in the case should only be provided with 
the permission of the patient.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, our policy is not 
to identify the submitter or institution. 
Cases and comments should be sent 
to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or 
MHECN, the Law & Health Care 
Program, University of Maryland 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., 
Baltimore, MD 21201.
CAse studY frOM  
A MArYlANd  
HOsPItAl NICu*
Baby G is a male infant who was born at 23 weeks gestation, weigh-
ing 540 grams.  He was transferred to 
a Level Three neonatal intensive care 
unit (NICU) at a Maryland hospital 
on continuous mandatory ventilation. 
Over the next three weeks, Baby G 
suffered from multiple maladies includ-
ing repeated pulmonary hemorrhage, 
intermittent need for high frequency 
oscillatory ventilation and multiple 
blood product transfusions, a Grade 
Three bilateral intraventricular (brain) 
hemorrhage, and intestinal perfora-
tion requiring placement of a drain 
and multiple antibiotics. Unable to 
take formula or fluids by mouth, Baby 
G receives total parental nutrition 
through a central IV line. He needs 
abdominal surgery to correct the in-
testinal perforation, but in his current 
condition is a very poor surgical risk. 
He is receiving opioid medication for 
pain and sedation.
Relations between Baby G's parents 
appear strained. They are both unem-
ployed and caring for a two year-old 
daughter. The baby’s father seldom 
visits the hospital. The gravity of Baby 
G’s condition is explained to them. 
Based solely on gestational age and 
weight at birth, survival estimates for 
Baby G range from 12% to 33%.  For 
infants with his degree of morbidity 
who survive, the chance of major dis-
ability during infancy is 80% or more. 
The parents are given the option of 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments 
and focusing on comfort care. Baby 
G’s mother insists that he receive full 
support, including full code status. She 
states that the baby’s survival is up to 
“God’s will.”
 The neonatologist consults the 
ethics committee regarding whether 
any of the life support interventions 
can be withheld (e.g., CPR attempts, 
blood products, medications to support 
blood pressure, abdominal surgery) or 
withdrawn (e.g., ventilator) based on 
medical ineffectiveness criteria.
*Details of this case were modified 
to protect confidentiality.
COMMeNts frOM A  
PedIAtrIC CrItICAl & 
PAllIAtIVe CAre  
PHYsICIAN
Pediatric cases involving medical futility are often difficult for all 
involved.  Physicians may feel that 
they are providing medically inappro-
priate care which violates their profes-
sional responsibilities.  Families may 
feel that where there is life, there is 
hope and wish to continue sustaining a 
life even though the chances of a good 
outcome are miniscule.  Nursing staff 
struggle as they witness the suffering 
of the infant or child hour by hour at 
the bedside, suffering which they feel 
will be to no good end.  
The greatest difficulties in such 
cases arise because determining 
prognosis in pediatrics, particularly in 
neonatology, can be difficult.  The case 
described mentions a 12-33% chance 
of survival and an 80% chance of 
major disability in those who survive.  
Families, and some physicians, have 
difficulty interpreting such statistics 
and applying them to the individual’s 
situation.  A family might listen to the 
above explanation and interpret that 
their child has a 20% chance of being 
absolutely normal, whereas the actual 
number is at best a 2-6% chance of 
an outcome ranging from minimal to 
moderate disability.  
Yet many parents might decide that 
a 6% chance is worth taking.  The 
healthcare team’s perspective, how-
ever, is influenced by the degree of 
suffering they have seen in similar 
children who fall into that other 94% 
who die or have severe disabilities.  
It is hard to argue with a family who 
might rationally choose to fight on 
against very small odds, but the team 
often gets frustrated with what they 
see as an irrational hope for a miracle.
In light of such uncertainty, how 
does one define “futility”?  There is a 
general consensus in law and in eth-
ics that physicians are not obligated 
to provide “medically ineffective 
therapy.”  A patient cannot walk into 
a neurosurgeon’s office and demand 
surgery for an inoperable brain tumor 
––the surgeon can rightfully say “I 
can’t fix this.”  In many cases, how-
ever, it becomes difficult to determine 
what is truly ineffective.  
Authors have attempted to deter-
mine different types of futility to help 
clarify the language that clinicians use. 
“Physiologic futility” means therapies 
which are simply unable to achieve a 
certain goal.  As an example, continu-
ing resuscitation attempts for more 
than an hour of asystole will not be 
able to achieve the goal of restoring 
a heartbeat.  In such a case, there is 
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no need for the healthcare team to get 
the family’s permission before stop-
ping CPR—there is simply nothing 
more they can do.  Our neonatal case 
does not entirely meet the definition of 
physiologic futility, as the ventilator in 
this case is quite successfully sustain-
ing breathing and circulation; how-
ever, it may be possible that pursuing 
abdominal surgery for the perforation 
would be obviously more risky than 
beneficial and there is no requirement 
to offer it if this is the case.
“Quantitative futility” has been 
proposed as an alternative, based on a 
calculation of the odds of a success-
ful outcome.  A 1% chance of success 
is often cited as a reasonable point 
at which a clinician could claim a 
therapy is futile.  Yet many families 
might still wish to persevere in the 
face of such odds.
“Qualitative futility” is the term used 
when  the outcome, from the patient’s 
perspective, will be such a poor qual-
ity of life that it is not worth pursuing 
the treatments.  Both quantitative and 
qualitative futility assessments include 
value judgments to some degree (what 
is too poor a quality of life or too low 
a risk of success?) and patients and 
families therefore typically share in 
the decision making about how ag-
gressively to pursue life-sustaining 
measures when these issues are raised. 
Because of the difficulty in de-
termining what is truly futile, many 
recent policies regarding futile or 
medically ineffective therapies have 
taken a procedural approach to these 
issues rather than attempting to some-
how define futile.1  Such an approach 
sets up a “due process” for resolving 
disputes whenever a clinician and 
patient or patient’s surrogate disagree 
about whether it is worth pursuing ag-
gressive measures.  Most such policies 
contain requirements for two physi-
cians to agree that the therapy is not 
indicated, for an independent review to 
take place (usually done by a hospital 
ethics or medical review committee), 
for the patient or family to be informed 
in writing that the review is taking 
place, and for the option of transfer 
to another provider or facility to be 
offered.  Most also impose a waiting 
period before any therapies can be 
discontinued.  Texas is the first state 
to have such a statewide procedure for 
futility disputes,2 and there is ongo-
ing debate about whether the process 
is fair to patients and families.  Many 
argue that a medical review committee 
associated with the hospital is much 
more likely to be biased in favor of the 
clinicians and that “futility” arguments 
are often used by clinicians as a trump 
card when they no longer wish to pro-
vide expensive, ongoing care.3, 4
The Maryland Healthcare Deci-
sions Act states that physicians are not 
required to provide ineffective thera-
pies that would not, with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty, prevent an 
impending death.  This does not mean, 
however, that therapies can be unilater-
ally withheld or withdrawn because a 
prognosis is poor.  The attorney gener-
al has stated that even if the patient has 
a fatal illness, a physician cannot write 
a unilateral “Do not attempt resuscita-
tion” order if resuscitation has a rea-
sonable chance of restoring the patient 
to his or her current condition (http://
www.oag.state.md.us/Healthpol/dn-
rauth.pdf).  In addition, life-sustaining 
measures cannot be withdrawn while 
options for transfer are being explored, 
with no definite limits set on how long 
a time period this encompasses.  
 So what is the team to do in the case 
of the unfortunate infant described 
here?  Sometimes the best path is to 
step away from trying to convince 
the family that aggressive treatments 
should be withdrawn and focus instead 
on working to build an alliance with 
the parents.  The health care providers 
should do the following:
• Try to understand better what 
awaiting “God’s will” means to the 
parents.  
• Meet with the parents frequently so 
that they get a good idea of the trajec-
tory of the child’s illness.  
• Help the parents find support 
through hospital staff such as social 
work or chaplaincy, their extended 
family or their own spiritual providers. 
• Insist on treating the infant’s suf-
fering with pain or sedative medica-
tions if necessary, while waiting to see 
what the outcome will be.  
• Let the parents know that they and 
their child will be treated with respect, 
no matter what course of action is 
taken.  
• Bring in a mediator such as the 
hospital ethics committee.  Provide de- 
briefings or other support for staff who 
are struggling with their own moral 
distress over the case.  
If the family and healthcare team can 
avoid developing entrenched adversar-
ial positions, and instead work together 
to negotiate what is in the best interest 
of the child, the right course of action 
may become more apparent with time.  
It is possible that the family will never 
agree to have aggressive measures 
discontinued, but if the therapy is truly 
“futile” then the current status will 
likely not continue indefinitely.
Wynne Morrison, MD
Director, Pediatric Critical Care 
Medicine Fellowship Program
Attending Physician, 
Critical Care and the Pediatric 
Advanced Care Team
The Children's Hospital
of Philadelphia
Department of Anesthesiology & 
Critical Care Medicine
University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine
Philadelphia, PA 
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atrics for medical futility. Pediatr Nurs. 
Mar-Apr 2001;27(2):180-184.
2.  Fine RL, Mayo TW. Resolution of futil-
ity by due process: early experience with 
the Texas Advance Directives Act. Ann 
Intern Med. May 6 2003;138(9):743-746.
3.  Truog RD, Mitchell C. Futility-from 
hospital policies to state laws. Am J Bio-
8  Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter
eth. Sep-Oct 2006;6(5):19-21; discussion 
W30-12.
4.  Truog RD. Tackling medical futility in 
Texas. N Engl J Med. Jul 5 2007;357(1):1-
3.
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 6
COMMeNts frOM A  
PedIAtrICIAN ANd  
etHICs CONsultANt
The neonatologist raises a good question––does it have to be all or 
nothing, or can one choose a few treat-
ments and not others for this baby, on 
the basis of sound ethical reasoning?
Withholding and withdrawing treat-
ments is always associated with a lot 
of angst and emotional heartbreak, not 
just for the parents, but also for the 
health care providers. Ethics consulta-
tion can provide an important source of 
moral support for the staff, and a voice 
of reason for all who are involved at 
this pivotal juncture.
Since the parents have been given a 
choice of comfort care, it shows that 
the medical team clearly feels that the 
future is too grim to continue aggres-
sive treatments. Perhaps a better way 
to resolve this dilemma would be for 
the medical team to make the “hard 
decision,” explain to the parents their 
reasoning for suggesting the shift from 
life-prolonging treatments to comfort 
care, and ask for the parents’ agree-
ment. If the parents do not disagree, 
life-prolonging treatments can be 
stopped or withheld. In my opinion, 
asking parents to make the “hard 
decision” to stop treatments that are 
prolonging their baby’s life is too great 
a burden for them to carry alone.
Before deciding on withholding and/
or withdrawing other life-sustaining 
treatments, it would be prudent to have 
an open, candid meeting with both the 
parents to set reasonable, mutually 
agreed upon goals of therapy that are 
clearly in the baby’s best interest. If 
the physician/parent meeting is not 
productive, an ethics committee con-
sult can help by clarifying short- and 
long-term goals, helping coordinate 
care, and mediating conflicts.  Al-
though these situations are difficult at 
best, major conflicts can be avoided 
by getting everyone concerned on the 
same page from the beginning. 
Physicians are under no obligation 
to provide treatments that are medi-
cally ineffective or ethically wrong. 
Treatments that are medically inef-
fective as judged by poor response 
from a trial of therapy can be withheld 
on the basis of medical ineffective-
ness.  As stipulated in the Maryland 
Health Care Decisions Act, this can 
be achieved by two physicians, one of 
them being the attending physician, 
documenting in the chart the inef-
fectiveness of those treatments before 
stopping them, and then informing the 
parents of this decision. 
CPR can be clearly withheld on the 
basis of futility. If the patient con-
tinues to worsen despite the present 
intensive support and treatment, and 
then has a cardiopulmonary arrest, 
clearly a CPR attempt is of no avail 
and could even be considered unethi-
cal.
The more difficult decision is that 
of discontinuing the ventilator. Years 
ago, the baby in this case study would 
have had no chance of survival. Now, 
it may be possible to keep this baby 
alive to be discharged from the NICU, 
albeit severely impaired. The ques-
tion of whether it is right to keep this 
baby alive with the technology that we 
have is an unanswered question. What 
criteria warrant choosing death over 
prolonging life with hi-tech medical 
interventions? Likelihood of death? 
Likelihood of severe neurological im-
pairment? Degree of pain and suffering 
endured? Inability to meaningfully 
interact? When uncertainty remains 
about a baby’s prognosis, deference is 
given to the parents to decide whether 
the primary goal of care should be life 
prolongation or comfort. If stopping 
a given therapy is likely to cause this 
baby’s death, according to Maryland 
law, it cannot be stopped without 
parental agreement. So, the ventila-
tor must be continued as long as the 
parents request this. Again, an ethics 
consult can be very helpful here. Set-
ting clear goals on a reasonable length 
of time to continue artificial support 
therapies, focusing on what is being 
done to care for the baby, and gently 
explaining to the parents signs that the 
baby’s condition is deteriorating can 
help the parents come to terms with 
a poor prognosis. The parents should 
receive adequate time to process 
information given to them, along with 
empathic counseling and pastoral care 
to support them through this process. 
In cases like these, there is often 
frustration and angst among the NICU 
staff related to inflicting pain and suf-
fering on a baby without a reasonable 
hope of survival or minimally accept-
able quality of life for the baby. The 
ethics committee should evaluate how 
the staff coped in response to this case, 
and explore ways to help them sort 
through the emotions, questions, and 
concerns this care-giving experience 
may have evoked. Of course, such 
support should also be available to the 
baby’s parents.
Shahid Aziz, MD
Ethics Consultant
Pediatrician
Chair, Harbor Hospital 
Ethics Committee
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CONsIderING BABY 
dOe rules
It is a truism that law and ethics, while usually complementary, are 
not synonymous. An ethics committee 
that always says, “Well, that’s it then” 
after an attorney’s pronouncement 
is itself ethically impoverished. Yet, 
law has a claim to respectful attention 
in the consultation process, for law 
reflects a distillation of social attitudes 
about the limits of morally accept-
able action. And, of course, an ethics 
committee will not be taken seriously 
if, cocooned within its own immunity 
from suit, it simply ignores concerns 
about liability.
At some point in the discussion 
about Baby G, someone might bring 
up “the Baby Doe rules.” This will 
stop the conversation, as clinicians 
worry that, even if a treatment meets 
state criteria for medical ineffective-
ness, withholding or withdrawing it 
will get them into legal trouble.
The federal law commonly known 
as the Baby Doe rules originated in 
controversy over parental decisions, 
with physician acquiescence, to forgo 
surgery and other interventions that 
might have preserved the lives of 
infants with Down syndrome and 
other disabilities. First adopted by 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services in 1983, restrictive regula-
tions directly applicable to hospitals 
were struck down by the courts. Then, 
in 1984, Congress amended the Child 
Abuse Protection and Treatment 
Act (CAPTA) to label as “medical 
neglect” some decisions to forgo 
treatment. The Department elaborated 
on the statute through regulations and 
interpretive guidelines.
The policymakers faced a dilemma. 
They wanted to stop infants from 
being left to die solely because of 
others’ judgments about future quality 
of life with a disability. Yet, they also 
understood that inflexibly mandat-
ing treatment could turn out to be a 
cruel disservice to dying patients. 
The result, as often happens when the 
words of the law are brought to bear 
on a problem with a myriad of varia-
tions and gradations, is recourse to 
ambiguity. The effect of the ambigu-
ous language is to allow the ethically 
sound process envisioned by the two 
physician commentators on the case.
The CAPTA amendments condi-
tion certain federal financial aid on a 
state’s having a system for respond-
ing to reports of medical neglect, 
“including instances of withholding 
of medically indicated treatment from 
disabled infants with life-threaten-
ing conditions.”  The “withholding of 
medically indicated treatment” occurs 
when one or more of the forgone 
treatments “will be most likely to be 
effective in ameliorating or correct-
ing all [of an infant’s] life-threaten-
ing conditions.” This likelihood is 
to be judged through “the treating 
physician’s or physicians’ reasonable 
medical judgment.”  To be considered 
in this exercise of judgment is wheth-
er a treatment would “merely prolong 
dying, not be effective in ameliorating 
or correcting all of the infant's life-
threatening conditions, or otherwise 
be futile in terms of the survival of 
the infant.” Nutrition, hydration, and 
medication are to be provided so long 
as they are deemed “appropriate.”
Under the Department’s guidelines, 
“reasonable medical judgment will 
be formed on the basis of knowledge 
about the condition(s) involved, 
the degree of inevitability of death, 
the probable effect of any potential 
treatments, the projected time period 
within which death will probably oc-
cur, and other pertinent factors.”  In 
Baby G’s case, as the commentators 
suggest, these are the very factors 
that ought to be part of the discus-
sion between the treatment team and 
Baby G’s mother (and father too, if he 
returns to play a role in the decision 
making).
To summarize: If the exercise of 
reasonable medical judgment is that 
continued ventilation is futile in terms 
of Baby G’s survival (if, for example, 
abdominal surgery is ruled out and the 
intestinal perforation itself will likely 
result in death), the Baby Doe rules 
do not bar withdrawal of the ventila-
tor. The same kind of judgment may 
be applied to the question of code 
status. Opioid medication ought to be 
continued indefinitely, however, as 
appropriate palliation.  Likewise, total 
parenteral nutrition ought to be contin-
ued unless and until it is deemed inap-
propriate in terms of Baby G’s present 
well-being. Finally, the physicians 
ought not to use the high probability 
of future disability as an argument 
to try to change the mother’s mind.  
To do so would be inconsistent with 
the present-oriented framework for 
discussion that the Baby Doe rules 
mandate.
Jack Schwartz, JD
Assistant Attorney General
Director of Health Policy
MD Attorney General’s Office
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Retaliatory consequences against health care profes-sionals (HCPs) who speak 
up about ethically worrisome condi-
tions or practices in their institution 
have reportedly included threats, peer 
rejection, demotion, and reprimand. 
Do HCPs who request ethics consults 
face retaliation? Danis and colleagues 
(2007) report on a survey of nurses 
and social workers in Massachusetts, 
Maryland, Ohio and California under-
taken to determine if they experienced 
or feared retaliation for requesting an 
ethics consult. They found that among 
those reporting access to an ethics 
consultation service, about 11% had 
experienced or observed other staff 
experience retaliation for requesting 
an ethics consult. About a third, while 
not experiencing or observing retalia-
tion, considered it to be a realistic fear. 
However, fear of retaliation was not 
associated with the likelihood or fre-
quency of requesting an ethics consult. 
The authors suggest that because the 
likelihood of requesting an ethics 
consult was not affected by the fear of 
retaliation, this may indicate that eth-
ics consultation offers a “sanctioned 
and safe venue in the healthcare work-
place for raising ethical questions,” 
and that “[p]erhaps ethics committees 
and consultants have succeeded in 
creating a forum for discussion of dif-
ficult ethical questions that levels the 
playing field and allows open discus-
sion of moral issues” (p. 33).  Findings 
from this study raise questions about 
the reputation of the ethics committee 
retAlIAtION fOr reQuestING
etHICs CONsultAtION?
maximize their abilities, perhaps more 
would have despaired at the character’s 
decision to end her life, and she may 
have come to a different decision about 
ending her life. 
Such an alternative view is poignant-
ly portrayed in the movie, The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly, which depicts 
French journalist and author Jean 
Dominique Bauby’s experiences after 
suffering a massive stroke and finding 
himself in a “locked-in” syndrome. His 
cognition was intact, but his body was 
completely paralyzed. His only method 
of communicating was by blinking his 
left eye. Bauby’s merit is well-recog-
nized by his caregivers, who devise 
a way for him to dictate the book he 
eventually writes about his experiences, 
pushing him beyond his initial thoughts 
within an institution, and its perceived 
accessibility. Of note in Danis and 
colleagues’ study is that about 52% 
of respondents (licensed registered 
nurses or social workers with at least 
10 hours a week of active patient care) 
reported not having access to an ethics 
consultation service. Considering that 
an ethics consult service may be one 
method of leveling power hierarchies 
within an institution, findings from 
this survey have relevance to those in-
terested in improving their institution’s 
ethical climate.
REFERENCE
Danis, M., Farrar, A., Grady, C., Tay-
lor, C., & O’Donnell, P. (2007). Does 
fear of retaliation deter requests for 
ethics consultation? Med Health Care 
and Philos, 11(1), 27-34.
of death. Discriminating against Mr. 
Bauby based on his disability would 
have caused him to suffer, and would 
have deprived him and the world of his 
beautiful book and subsequent movie. 
No evidence has been presented that 
the “Ashley Treatment” has caused or 
will cause Ashley to suffer (assuming 
adequate post-op pain management), 
or that it limits her potential to flour-
ish. This is because Ashley has a very 
limited experiential range. 
Thus, the distinction I’m making is 
not between physical and cognitive 
disability, but in the individual’s level 
of cognitive potential. Individuals who 
are neurologically devastated such that 
they will never attain self-awareness 
or think for themselves (with Ashley X 
on one end of this continuum and Terri 
Schiavo on the other) seem to warrant a 
different obligation from society—not 
to maximize their potential (since they 
have no further cognitive potential to 
develop), but to treat them with respect, 
care, and dignity. That can be achieved 
without concluding that they have 
unactualized potential they’re deprived 
of accessing due to societal prejudice. 
To get serious about disability preju-
dice and discrimination in our society, 
I think we need to get clearer about 
our use and understanding of the terms 
disability and disability discrimina-
tion. 
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
Tarzian's Response 
Cont. from page 5
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter  11
CAleNdAr Of eVeNts
APrIl
   24  Practical Clinical Ethics. Sponsored by Harbor Hospital’s Ethics Committee. Harbor Hospital’s Baum 
Auditorium at 3001 South Hanover Street, Baltimore, MD. For more information, contact Sally Lewis at 
410-350-8218.
   29 Ethical Dilemmas in Research Involving Children: Damned whether you do or you don’t. SUNY Downstate 
Medical Center, Brooklyn, NY. For more information, call Alice Herb at (718) 270-2752 or e-mail aherb@
downstate.edu.
MAY
   6-7 The Patient Alone: Making Health Care Choices For Patients Without Surrogates. Sponsored by American 
Health Decisions. John Hancock Hotel & Conference Center, Boston, Massachusetts. For more information, 
visit http://www.ahd.org/conference.html. 
   8–9  Ethical Challenges in Surgical Innovation. Sponsored by the Cleveland Clinic. InterContinental Hotel, 
Cleveland, OH. For more information, call (216) 932 3448, or visit http://www.clevelandclinicmeded.com/
live/courses/2008/ethicalsurgery08/faculty.htm.
   13–14 Seeing Making Healing: Art, the Arts, and Creativity in Medicine and the Medical Humanities: The Sixth 
Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Medical Humanities Consortium. Carnegie Museum of Art, Pittsburgh, 
PA. For more information, call (412) 647-5700. 
   14 More is Not Always Better: Seeking Value in End-of-Life Care. Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of 
Ethics Committees. 2008 Stonewall Resort, Morgantown, VA. MHECN members receive a 20% registration 
discount. For more information, call (877) 209-8086 or e-mail cjamison@hsc.wvu.edu.
JuNe
   2–6  The Future of Bioethics—How It Began. Where It’s Going. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Intensive 
Bioethics Course. For more information, visit http://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/courses/ibc/ibc2008.
htm. 
   14  How Do I Determine if My Patient has Capacity to Make Medical Decisions? Assessing Decision Making 
Capacity. Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning, University of San Francisco. San Francisco, CA. For more 
information, visit http://www.cpmc.org/services/ethics/seminar.html. 
 
JulY
   17–19 Nursing Ethics Health Care Policy: Bridging Local, National & International Perspectives. Yale University 
School of Nursing, 100 Church St. South, New Haven, CT. For more information, visit http://nursing.yale.
edu/Centers/International/EthicsConference/. 
 
   14-17     Building clinical ethics capacity, bettering patient care. Clinical Ethics Summer Institute, Hamilton Health 
Sciences. Hamilton, ON (Canada). For more information, visit http://www.clinicalethics.ca, or e-mail 
info_clinicalethics@hhsc.ca.
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